All Things Shining Part II

He deals the cards as a meditation

And those he plays never suspect

He doesn’t play for the money he wins

He don’t play for respect

 

He deals the cards to find the answer

The sacred geometry of chance

The hidden law of a probable outcome

The numbers lead a dance

 

– Shape of My Heart, Sting

So, even after skipping to the final chapter and registering my initial thoughts on this site (see below my post “Initial Thoughts on ‘All Things Shining’”), I went back to the other chapters and finished reading the book (yep, I actually did). Doing so gave me a lot more context on where the authors are coming from and simultaneously served as an organized introduction to some philosophers and literature pieces I knew little or nothing about.

Grossly oversimplifying, their main point, as I understand it, is that there are opportunities to experience the sacred in a Godless world. There is no need to believe in a God (or Gods) to do so, only the predisposition to perceive and experience “moods” in the world around us, be part of those moods that come and go like a wave (“whoosh”) and nurture our capacity to do so like an artisan nurture’s its craft. They contrast their view with that of other philosophers and writers, briefly describing a history of western thought that evolved from a polytheist experience of “moods,” such as those in Homer’s work, to a more monotheistic type worldview in classical Greece, and then through two paradigm shifts (Jesus Christ and Christianity and the Enlightenment and Renee Descartes) that gradually brought us to a nihilist reality, centered on the self-sufficient individual (I find my own pretense of summarizing much of a book in one paragraph astonishing, but…there it is!). For my own benefit, I attempted to organize my understanding of their portrayal of this history of philosophy in Figure 1 below (including a few of my unresolved questions).

Figure 1 – Notes that likely only I am able to follow


There seems to be: a)  an essential assumption in the authors’ reasoning, and b) an essential observation.

The assumption is that meaning is to be found outside of ourselves. We cannot successfully impose it. They make this argument in the second chapter of the book, when discussing David Foster Wallace’s Nihilism and his proposition that we can impose meaning on our reality. They state this possibility is “the most demanding and the most impoverished all at once” (p 47):

  • Most demanding because:
    • It raises the stakes for happiness and demands a kind of bliss that supersedes any kind of earthly condition (ps. 47-48). They later equate this with the Buddhist concept of Nirvana (see ps 163-164).
    • It demands that bliss be constant and achieved at all times (p. 48)
  • Impoverished because there is no place for gratitude (p.48)

They reject this option as a source of meaning and re-emphasize on several occasions throughout the book. For example, on p 142: “The history of the last 150 years suggests that we are not the proper source for meaning in the world”

I, quite frankly, don’t see how they deduce any of the points above. The fact that they seem convinced that they have made their case and discuss the rest of the book as if meaning must be found outside the self, to me, unfortunately, weakens the entire book that, otherwise, I find very interesting, illuminating even. To top it off, as mentioned in my previous post below, they take the cheap shot of using the example of David Foster Wallace’s suicide to emphasize that this is the only possible ending. Thinking back, if all this had sunk in while I was reading the book, I probably would have stopped right there. But I am glad that I continued reading and can enjoy the rest of the book by thinking of the above as an assumption made by the authors, not something they were really set to demonstrate. I can live with that and address the assumption elsewhere.

The observation I can easily agree with. The observation is that we cannot control everything that happens outside of ourselves. We do not fully control our world and the events that surround us. This seems to me to be patently and observably true. It is even arguable that we do not control everything about ourselves (such as quick, intuitive thinking, and involuntarily biological processes).

Given the “assumption” and the “observation” (by the way, these designations are mine, not the authors’), this leads them through a path of wanting to be in-sync with, immersed in, aware of this uncontrolled and uncontrollable environment, and the external “moods” that are generated with the idea that, in doing so, we generate an opportunity to experience meaning, something we can call sacred. I see the appeal of this way of thinking and I see parallels with oriental philosophy that, for some reason the authors seem to want to negate.

Now here is where my thoughts go next: what if we look at the whooshing, the moods, the physis we are exposed to as being generated by random events? We can even choose to look at our own choices and the choices of those around us as generated by random events or being individual outcomes of random events (leaving aside the fact that, in that case, we probably wouldn’t discuss them as “choices”). If we think about the examples the author’s give in these terms, how would our outlook on meaning differ?

To use one of the author’s examples, say we are at a sporting event and collectively experience an athlete “in the zone.” We all realize what is happening and collectively feel we have been a part of something special. For this special moment to occur, we need to have gone to the sporting event, and we need to have been open to experience the athlete’s performance as something special. In addition, those around us need to have done so as well, and at least one athlete must have been “in the zone” on that day. We can look at the aspects of this experience that we do not control as random events: the choices and behaviors of others attending the game, and the likelihood that at least one athlete will be “in the zone.” In that case, our special experience, our experience of the “sacred,” would be one possible outcome of a joint probability distribution of the random events we are exposed to. Why is there a stronger argument to feel gratitude in this case, then in any other outcome of the joint distribution?

In the end, it seems to me what really matters is what the authors’ assumed away in the first two chapters of the book: whether meaning can be attributed from within, whether it needs to be defined in relation to something outside ourselves, and whether meaning should be attributed at all, at least if we look at the world as one that can be described by joint distributions of random events. It is as if the author’s efforts to propose an alternative to today’s nihilism relies on first simply assuming away nihilism as a viable outlook on life. It seems to me the central question is to what extent we think of what we experience in the world as being random or deterministic.

The discussion above takes me to a memory of my father. My father was an engineer. He was very intelligent and liked math. He was also very Catholic. I have this recollection of a period when he was logging into a table the results of the national lottery where he lived. The idea was that, perhaps, he could find a pattern in the lottery numbers. A pattern that would maybe signal some higher order or something he could be “in-sync” with, tuned into. I am sure he would have liked to win the lottery, and he would have interpreted it as a gift from God. Many Catholics view the world as a place where everything happens for a reason. But I honestly think that the discovery of a pattern itself would have been way more rewarding to him than any payments he would have received from winning the lottery. It would have proven the existence of a higher order and at the same time provided some personal intellectual gratification. It is possible to think of my father’s attempt, and it seems to me of the entire book discussed above, as ultimately stemming from a kind of wishful thinking. One that is not unappealing to me, yet difficult for me to accept. One that is difficult for me to accept, yet not unappealing to me.

I don’t think my father knew much statistics, or perhaps didn’t care much for it. And, spoiler alert, to my knowledge he never found a pattern in the lottery numbers, or at least not one that proved successful in winning the national lottery. Interestingly enough, he did many years later win a car in a lottery from the club he belonged to: it was close to Christmas time and he did quite desperately need a new car. He interpreted it as a gift, perhaps even as a reward for his faith, and I am sure he was thankful. Relevant to the discussion above: he did not pick the numbers.

Reference:

Dreyfus, Hubert and Sean Dorrance Kelly. 2011. All Things Shining. Reading the Western Classics to Find Meaning in a Secular Age. New York: Free Press.

Continue ReadingAll Things Shining Part II

Initial Thoughts on “All Things Shining”

I started reading “All Things Shining: Reading the Western Classics to Find Meaning in a Secular Age,” by philosophy professors Herbert Dreyfus (Berkeley) and Sean Dorrance Kelly (Harvard). At the end of the second chapter, after using authors David Foster Wallace and Elizabeth Gilbert to illustrate contrasting views on how meaning is generated or attributed in our daily lives, they end with the following paragraph:

“The question that remains is whether Gilbert and Wallace between them have completely covered the terrain. In Wallace’s Nietschean view, we are the sole active agents in the universe, responsible for generating out of nothing whatever notion of the sacred and divine there can ever be. Gilbert, by contrast, takes a kind of mature Lutheran view. On her account we are purely passive recipients of God’s divine will, nothing but receptacles for the grace he may choose to offer. Is there anything in between? We think there is, and we will try to develop it in the final chapter of the book.” (p. 57)

Needless to say, I skipped to the final chapter.

In that chapter they suggest there is present, today, in our culture, opportunities to generate a kind of experience where, we neither need to impose meaning on our world, nor passively await for meaning to descend upon our lives.

They start by suggesting that there are often collective experiences of marvel, bliss, exhultation. Experiences like those where expectators attending a live sporting event witness an athlete “in the zone” and are collectively taken by the experience. Or when, also collectively, we rejoice in a skilled orator’s speech. They equate these experiences with moments of realization of Homer’s notion of physis: how the world is in as much as it presents itself to us. They also suggest the exhultation of these collective experiences come and go as a wave. They use the term “whoosh” to describe it.

They then recognize the dangers of “whooshing,” like when the collective experience is dominated by some type of mass mentality and pack behavior, and where rational self-control is obliterated.

But they claim there is another type of experience available to us, which also offers an opportunity for experiencing meaning in our physical connection to the world, and which, in addition, can be used to discern between “good” and “bad” whooshing. They equate that experience with the Aristotelian term: poiesis. Poiesis captures a craftsman’s like practice of developing an intimate understanding and relationship with some aspect of our world. A relationship characterized by a “feedback loop between craftsman and craft” (p.211) and through which meaning also arises.

But “poiesis” too has its limitations, in that, in our world, it is under attack by technology. Technology that reduced our need to deeply understand our world to reach our goals. An example they give is that of GPS, through which we can move from one place to another, simply by following orders, and with never building significant knowledge of our surroundings.

The authors then argue that it is up to us to discover, in what we already care about, the opportunities for poiesis. Whether it is in drinking a cup of coffee in the morning, enjoying a walk, or the company of a friend. In other words, discovering it in our relationship to the world, and then nurturing it, transforming routine into ritual. They argue that is the realm of the sacred that exists currently in our world: a rich polytheistic world where the sacred manifests itself through physis and poiesis, and where technology has its place, without completely erasing the opportunities for the sacred.

I am very much enjoying the book, and intend to read the chapters in between (really…at some point), but here are a few thoughts based on the three chapters I read already:

  • In trying to describe how we can discover what we care about and build rituals around routines to nourish our experience of being in this world through poiesis, they use the example of having coffee each morning. They suggest asking what we like about this routine, whether it is the warmth of the coffee, the striking black color, the aroma. That is, they appeal to the senses. This appeal to the senses is very similar to how I have learned to practice mindfulness, to be present in this world, based on my understanding of the practice and the teachings of Thich Naht Hahn. Other parallels to eastern ways of thinking could be made when discussing Wallace’s “This is Water” commencement speech in chapter two. Yet, the authors do not seem to be interested in discussing these potential parallels, at least not in the parts I have read.
  • In discussing Wallace’s nihilism, they propose that, to the extent that he can see any space for the sacred, his attempt to reach it is by imposing meaning on experience, creating this meaning out of nothing, and constantly doing so. There are no constraints on the meaning Wallace can impose on his experience. They suggest this self-imposed task is not humanly possible. In fact, they state that “in such a world, as Melville understood, grim perseverance is possible for a while; but in the end suicide is the only choice” (p.50). I a) do not see how or why “suicide is the only choice,” and b) find this statement actually in bad taste, to say the least, since Wallace did commit suicide. His example is rather an unfairly picked choice, unnecessarily making use of someone’s suicide to make their argument.
  • The authors describe Wallace and Gilbert as having a similar view of the purpose of writing: translating life, conveying what it means to be human, becoming less alone. If the interpretation of our world and our condition is actually an intrinsic and inseparable part of our human condition, one could argue that storytelling is not just interpreting what it means to be human, but actually contributing to creating that condition. Storytelling would then be a way of creating rather than just interpreting our world. I have for a while found this way of thinking appealing, and it is different from what the authors claim to be the views of Wallace and Gilbert. It is perhaps more in tune with Mario Vargas Llosa’s story in his book “El Hablador.” Perhaps something I will explore further in the future.

Reference:

Dreyfus, Hubert and Sean Dorrance Kelly. 2011. All Things Shining. Reading the Western Classics to Find Meaning in a Secular Age. New York: Free Press.

Continue ReadingInitial Thoughts on “All Things Shining”

Illusions and Delusions

I recently read a bit about the Buddhist concept of “pratitya samutpada,” translated literally or liberally as “in dependence, things rise up,” “interdependent co-arising,” or simply “dependent rising” (Hahn 1998; Namgyel 2018). There seem to be two main aspects of the concept. The first is that what we perceive as separate entities are only so at a superficial level. In truth, they are part of a whole and, as part of that whole, they are connected, mutually affect each other, rather than one entity being the cause of the other or being independent of the other. The second aspect of the concept of pratitya samutpada is that those entities that we perceive as separate are constantly changing, morphing into other and new aspects of the whole. The consequence of this concept is that, if we focus on the separate entities that we perceive, we can fall into a kind of delusion, where we do not see the dynamic interdependence that governs the entities we perceive.

This concept seems to have similarities with other concepts in Asian philosophy such as that of yin and yang, where opposites are part of a whole, but also with common ideas in western science and philosophy: from Lavoisier’s formulation that in nature “nothing is lost, nothing is created, everything is transformed,” to Hegel’s dialectics and the concept of “aufheben,” often translated as “self-sublation,” a process that simultaneously negates and preserves forms or concepts that previously seemed well defined and stable (Maybee 2020; Wikipedia Contributors 2021)¹. How often and to what extent does this idea of a dynamic, interdependent world lead to conclusions about our capacity to see through the temporary, perhaps time and space specific formations, and grasp the whole of what is actually going on? How often are we “deluded” into thinking that the temporary and time-specific reality that we perceive is more permanent than it is or that it is all there is? How often does it matter?

The dictionary distinguishes between the terms illusion and delusion in subtle ways. Merriam-Websters definitions:

Illusion:

    1. something that looks or seems different from what it is : something that is false or not real but that seems to be true or real
    2.  an incorrect idea : an idea that is based on something that is not true

[Merriam-Webster. Undated (a)]

Delusion:

    1. a belief that is not true : a false idea
    2. a false idea or belief that is caused by mental illness

[Merriam-Webster. Undated (b)]

The definitions above seem to suggest illusion happens in the realm of perception and ideas; delusion is closer to beliefs and mental illness. One of my Buddist references for this post distinguishes between illusion and delusion by stating that “illusion refers to seeing through appearances by recognizing their independent nature. Delusion, on the other hand, refers to misapprehending things to have an independent reality from  their own side” (Namygel 2018, p. 25). In other words, illusions do not necessarily fool you into beliefs, delusions do.

Joni Mitchel’s beautifully mesmerizing song “Both sides now” uses the term illusion similarly, in the sense that the composer is aware that her recollections are illusions, whether they be about clouds, love or life, and concludes that she knows nothing about them at all. E.g.:

I've looked at life from both sides now
From win and lose and still somehow
It's life's illusions I recall
I really don't know life at all

The distinction between illusion and delusion brings to mind (for me, at least) the challenge of translating social science modeling into public policy without losing sight of model limitations. 

Social science models are often able to represent mathematically the two aspects of “pratitya samutpada:” interdependence and dynamics. But, as with all models, simplifications are needed for tractability and the consequences of the model will depend on those simplifications made, assumptions about what variables are more or less important, functional relationships, bounding of magnitudes, temporal lags. These assumptions can be informed or rejected by empirical work, to some extent. What exactly is that extent, how much certainty academics attribute to their models is, based on my humble experience, influenced early on by human flaws. Whether it is an overemphasis on quickly thinking within the confines of established methodological approaches that leads to a poor understanding of the limitations of those approaches themselves, or whether it is the difficulty of living with uncertainty, or perhaps just plain vanity, it is my impression that academics themselves often lose sight of the limitations of their models and fall into the temptation of making grand but unsupported statements about the world they live in.

When the next step is taken (whether by academics themselves. policy makers, or by mere practitioners like me) to translate conclusions of limited validity to policy that needs to be developed for a specific time and space, it seems like the assumptions, limitations and caveats of academic discourse are further forgotten. Before we know it, the illusion of general principles, guidelines, best practices and rules of thumb, that we would hope to be well understood as the illusions they are, morph into the delusion of ideological constructs, over-simplified, over-generalized, distorted by the influence of a kaleidoscope of interest groups, and imbued by a certainty they do not merit. 

In a world of unmerited certainty, Joni Mitchell’s illusions, the awareness of them, seems something to strive for, to appreciate in its melancholic beauty, and to sing in a song.

Footnote:

  1. Antoine Lavoisier, French chemist, and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, German philosopher, were contemporaries during the late 18th century.

References

Hanh, Thich Nhat. 1998. The Heart of Buddha’s Teaching: Transforming Suffering into Peach, Joy, and Liberation. Harmony Books.

Maybee, Julie E., Hegel’s Dialectics. In: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). Available: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hegel-dialectics/. Accessed: February 13, 2022

Merriam-Webster. Undated (a). Illusion. In Merriam-Webster.com dictionary. Available: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/illusion. Accessed: February 13, 2022

Merriam-Webster. Undated (b). Delusion. In Merriam-Webster.com dictionary. Available: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/delusion. Accessed: February 13, 2022

Namgyel, Elizabeth Mattis. 2018. The Logic of Faith: A Buddhist Approach to Finding Certainty Beyond Belief and Doubt. Shambhala Publications. 

Wikipedia contributors. 2021. Aufheben. In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Available: https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Aufheben&oldid=1050479001. Accessed: February 13, 2022

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